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Shaw: American Military Tribunals

DUE PROCESS IN AMERICAN MILITARY TRIBUNALS
AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
Gary Shaw*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The al-Qaeda attack on the United States on September 11,
2001, resulted in Congress passing a joint resolution, the Authorization for Use of Military Force (―AUMF‖),1 which authorizes the President to ―use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks . . . or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international
terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations, or
persons.‖2
Pursuant to the AUMF, President Bush committed armed
forces to Afghanistan in order to subdue al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime that supported al-Qaeda.3 President Bush claimed that the
AUMF granted him the authority to hold an ―enemy combatant‖ who
was captured, ―without formal charges or proceedings,‖ until a determination has been made ―that access to counsel or further process
is warranted.‖4 This position gave rise to several cases in which the
Supreme Court had to grapple with the issue of what process was due
to captured enemy combatants.5 Could they be held indefinitely
*

Professor of Law, Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center. Thank you to
my colleagues who read prior drafts and made valuable suggestions.
1
Authorization for Use of Military Force, 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c) (2006).
2
Id.
3
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004).
4
Id. at 510-11.
5
See generally Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,

29
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without charges or proceedings being initiated? If proceedings had to
be initiated, what process was due to the defendants? In determining
the answers to these questions, the Supreme Court distinguished between two different categories—United States citizens who were
deemed enemy combatants and non-citizens who were deemed enemy combatants.6
The recurring theme that arises in reading the Court‘s decisions resolving these issues is the power struggle between the Executive and Judicial branches of the United States Government as to
which branch possesses the power to determine due process for enemy combatants.7 Initially, the Executive claimed that it possessed the
power to solely decide who was an enemy combatant as well as what
process, if any, was due to the persons it determined were enemy
combatants.8 Ultimately, the Supreme Court found it unnecessary to
decide the first question.9 Moreover, the Court also rejected the latter
position, determining that the Judiciary, not the Executive, was the
arbiter of what process was due an enemy combatant.10
II.

THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
A.

Process Due to a United States Citizen Deemed an
Enemy Combatant

In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,11 the Supreme Court dealt with the issue of what process is due to a United States citizen deemed to be an
enemy combatant by the government.12 Yaser Hamdi was a United

548 U.S. 557 (2006); Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507.
6
Compare Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516, with Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 470
(2004), Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 558, and Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 732 (comparing
the difference between U.S. citizens and non-citizens being deemed enemy combatants).
7
See generally Boumediene, 553 U.S. 723; Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557; Hamdi, 542
U.S. 507; Rasul, 542 U.S. 466.
8
See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 527-28 (arguing that courts have ―limited institutional
capabilities . . . in matters of military decision-making‖).
9
Id. at 516-17.
10
Id. at 535-37.
11
542 U.S. 507 (2004).
12
Id. at 509.
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States citizen living in Afghanistan in 2001.13 ―[H]e was seized by
members of the Northern Alliance, a coalition of military groups opposed to the Taliban government, and eventually was turned over to
the United States military.‖14 Subsequently, he was transferred to a
naval brig in the United States and held there.15 The Government
claimed that Hamdi had been fighting on behalf of the Taliban and
was thus an enemy combatant who could be held as described
above.16
Hamdi‘s father filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus as a
next friend in the Eastern District of Virginia, arguing that Hamdi‘s
indefinite detention without charges, access to an impartial tribunal,
or assistance of counsel violated Hamdi‘s right to due process.17
―The District Court found that Hamdi‘s father was a proper next
friend, appointed the federal public defender as counsel for the petitioners, and ordered that counsel be given access to Hamdi.‖18 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed,
claiming that the district court had failed to properly consider the
―Government‘s security and intelligence interests.‖19 It remanded the
case, instructing the district court ―to conduct a deferential inquiry into Hamdi‘s status.‖20
On remand, the Government moved to dismiss the petition.21
Its sole evidence that Hamdi was an enemy combatant consisted of a
declaration from Michael Mobbs, who was identified as a Special
Advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy regarding detention of enemy combatants.22 ―The [Mobbs] declaration state[d]
that Hamdi ‗traveled to Afghanistan‘ in July or August of 2001 . . .
‗affiliated with a Taliban military unit and received weapons training,‘ ‖23 and that when the Taliban engaged in battle with the Northern Alliance, Hamdi‘s military unit surrendered and Hamdi turned
13

Id. at 510.
Id.
15
Id.
16
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510-11.
17
Id. at 511.
18
Id. at 512.
19
Id. (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 279, 283 (4th Cir. 2002)).
20
Id.
21
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 512.
22
Id.
23
Id. at 512-13 (quoting Joint Appendix at 148, Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (No. 036696), 2004 WL 1120871).
14
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over his weapon to the Northern Alliance.24 The Mobbs declaration
further asserted ―that Hamdi was labeled an enemy combatant
‗[b]ased upon his interviews and in light of his association with the
Taliban.‘ ‖25 The declaration stated that ―a series of ‗U. S. military
screening team[s]‘ determined that Hamdi met the ‗criteria for enemy
combatants,‘ and ‗[a] subsequent interview . . . confirmed the fact
that he surrendered‘ ‖ to the Northern Alliance and gave them his
weapon.26 The district court thus held ―that the Mobbs declaration
fell ‗far short‘ of supporting Hamdi‘s detention.‖27 The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the declaration, ―if accurate,‖ was sufficient to support the Executive‘s decision to detain Hamdi.28
There were two issues before the Supreme Court in Hamdi.
The initial issue was whether the Executive had plenary power to detain enemy combatants.29 The second issue was what process, if any,
was due to persons who were detained as enemy combatants.30 The
Supreme Court was badly splintered on how to resolve these two issues. Justice O‘Connor issued a plurality opinion, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Breyer, in which she announced the judgment of the Court; Justice Souter, joined by Justice
Ginsburg, concurred in part and dissented in part; Justice Scalia,
joined by Justice Stevens, dissented; and Justice Thomas dissented.31
The Court ultimately concluded that it did not have to decide
the first issue, finding that Congress had authorized the Executive to
detain enemy combatants.32 Five Justices (O‘Connor, the justices
joining her plurality opinion, and Justice Thomas) concluded that the
AUMF authorized the detention.33 The plurality made clear, howev-

24

Id. at 513.
Id. (quoting Joint Appendix, supra note 23, at 149).
26
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 513 (quoting Joint Appendix, supra note 23, at 149-50).
27
Id. (quoting Joint Appendix at 292, Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (No. 03-6696), 2004
WL 1123351, at *292).
28
Id. at 514 (quoting Hamdi, 316 F.3d 450, 473 (4th Cir. 2004)).
29
Id. at 516.
30
Id. at 524.
31
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 508, 539, 554, 579.
32
Id. at 516-18.
33
See id. at 519 (concluding that although the AUMF did not explicitly speak of
detention, detention was necessary to prevent an enemy combatant from returning
to battle). Thus, because the AUMF permitted ―the use of ‗necessary and
appropriate force,‘ ‖ the plurality concluded that this authorized detention under the
circumstances in Hamdi‘s case. Id. (quoting Joint Appendix, supra note 27, at
25
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er, that detention was only authorized when it was ―sufficiently clear
that the individual is, in fact, an enemy combatant.‖34 This reasoning
required that a determination be made as to whether there was sufficient evidence that an individual is an enemy combatant, which necessarily raised the issue of what process is due to an individual in the
determination as to whether he was an enemy combatant.35
In resolving what process was due, two sub-issues needed to
be settled. The first was which branch was to decide the process due
to the detained individuals.36 The second was what process was in
fact due in determining whether an individual was being properly detained.37 Regarding the issue of who decided what process was due,
the Executive‘s position was that under the doctrines of separation of
powers and political question—in this case, the Supreme Court‘s lack
of qualifications in ―matters of military decision-making‖—the Judiciary was limited only to determining whether authorization existed
―for the broader detention scheme‖ and had no authority to determine
the propriety of individual detentions.38 Alternatively, the Executive
argued that the Court ―should review . . . [the Executive‘s] determination that a . . . [person] is an enemy combatant under a very deferential . . . standard.‖39 A majority of the Court (Justice O‘Connor, the
justices joining her plurality opinion, and Justice Scalia, joined by
Justice Stevens in his dissent) rejected both of these positions, ruling
284). Justice Thomas, in his dissent, accepted the essence of this analysis. Id. at
587 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
34
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 523 (plurality opinion).
To be clear, our opinion only finds legislative authority to detain
under the AUMF once it is sufficiently clear that the individual
is, in fact, an enemy combatant; whether that is established by
concession or by some other process that verifies this fact with
sufficient certainty seems beside the point.
Id. Although Justice Thomas agreed with the plurality that the Government ―has
power to detain those that the Executive branch determines to be enemy
combatants,‖ he disagreed with the plurality about the Judiciary‘s authority to
determine whether or not the defendant was ―actually an enemy combatant.‖ Id. at
585-86, 589 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas believed that the Judiciary
lacked the expertise and capacity to ―second-guess‖ a determination by the
Executive that the defendant was an enemy combatant. Id. at 585, 589.
35
Id. at 524 (plurality opinion).
36
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 525-26.
37
Id. at 524.
38
Id. at 527.
39
Id.
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that it is the Judiciary that makes these determinations.40
However, the Court did not agree on how the determination as
to what process is due should be made.41 The plurality stated that the
determination should be made by adopting the balancing test from
Mathews v. Eldridge.42 In Mathews, the Supreme Court balanced
three factors in deciding what process is due in a given circumstance.43 The first factor to be considered is the ―private interest that
will be affected by the [governmental] action.‖44 In Hamdi, it is the
detainee‘s liberty, a very important interest.45 The second factor is
the government‘s interest and the burden that would be placed on the
government in providing greater process.46 The plurality noted the
weight of the Government‘s interest in preventing enemy combatants
from returning to do battle against the United States, but stated this
did not outweigh the individual‘s liberty interest to such an extent
that it allowed for unchallenged detention.47 The third factor is ―the
risk of an erroneous deprivation‖ of the defendant‘s liberty interest
and what the probable value of additional or substitute safeguards
would be.48 The plurality stated that when the interests of the individual and government were balanced against each other, ―the risk of
40

Justice O‘Connor‘s plurality decision explicitly rejected the Executive‘s
argument that separation of powers circumscribed the Judiciary‘s role in assessing
the process due an individual in Hamdi‘s circumstances. Id. at 535-36. Focusing
on the respective roles of the branches, O‘Connor stated that ―unless Congress acts
to suspend it, the Great Writ of habeas corpus allows the Judicial Branch to play a
necessary role in maintaining this delicate balance of governance, serving as an
important judicial check on the Executive‘s discretion in the realm of detentions.‖
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536. Justice Scalia, in his dissent, concluded that the Executive
did not have the sole power to determine the propriety of detention, stating that
Hamdi should be released unless criminal charges were brought against him (which
would involve the judiciary) or ―Congress ha[d] suspended the writ of habeas
corpus.‖ Id. at 573 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia concluded that Congress had not
done so simply by passing the AUMF and thus, the Executive did not have the
authority to detain Hamdi. Id. at 573-75.
41
Compare id. at 528-29 (plurality opinion), with id. at 583 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (discussing due process and concerns of national security).
42
424 U.S. 319 (1976); Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 528-29 (plurality opinion) (citing
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
43
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335; see also Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529.
44
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335; see also Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529.
45
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529.
46
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335; see also Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529.
47
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 531-32.
48
Id. at 529 (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
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an erroneous deprivation . . . [was] unacceptably high,‖ unless the citizen-detainee was entitled to ―notice of the factual basis for his classification and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government‘s factual assertions before a neutral decision maker.‖49 Although not adopting
the plurality‘s reasoning that Mathews applied, Justice Souter, joined
by Justice Ginsburg, concurred that detainees were entitled to this
process, creating a majority on these points.50
The plurality then went on to state that it might be appropriate
to admit hearsay evidence ―as the most reliable available evidence‖ at
the hearings.51 No other justices adopted this position, although none
explicitly rejected it. The plurality further stated that it might be
permissible for there to be ―a presumption in favor of the Government‘s evidence, so long as‖ there was a fair opportunity for the detainee to rebut the presumption.52 Justice Souter, joined by Justice
Ginsburg, explicitly rejected this standard and no other justices
agreed to it.53
Therefore, the only process which a majority of the Court
agreed was necessary was (a) notice of the factual basis for his classification, and (b) a fair opportunity to rebut the Government‘s factual
assertions before a neutral decision maker.54 Justices Scalia, Stevens,
and Thomas failed to address any of the specifics regarding process
discussed above. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens, concluded
that enemy combatants should be tried in the criminal court system.55
Scalia argued that unless Congress suspends the writ of habeas corpus, the criminal justice system is the only available method for incapacitating and punishing those accused of treason56 and concluded
that the AUMF did not suspend the writ of habeas corpus.57 Consequently, he did not address the specifics as to what process would be
due in military tribunals. Justice Thomas concluded that it was not
appropriate for the Judiciary to consider the issues presented in Ham49

Id. at 532-33 (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
Id. at 553 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in
the judgment).
51
Id. at 533-34 (plurality opinion).
52
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534.
53
Id. at 553-54 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring
in the judgment).
54
Id.
55
Id. at 564, 568 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
56
Id.
57
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 573-75.
50
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di, concluding that the Court was precluded from adjudicating by the
doctrine of political question.58 Therefore, he also did not address the
specific aspects of due process in military tribunals.
B.

Process Due to Non-Citizen Aliens Deemed Enemy
Combatants

The battle to determine the extent of Executive power vis-àvis Congress as well as the Supreme Court‘s power to determine
what process is due continued through three more cases, Rasul v.
Bush,59 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,60 and Boumediene v. Bush.61 These
three cases differ from Hamdi in that Hamdi deals with a United
States citizen being held in the United States whereas, Rasul, Hamdan, and Boumediene deal with non-United States citizens being held
at the United States Naval Station in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.62
In Rasul, the Court specifically dealt with the preliminary issue of whether or not United States courts had ―jurisdiction to consider challenges to the‖ detention of non-United States citizens captured in connection with hostilities outside the United States who
were then incarcerated at Guantánamo.63 In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court held that pursuant to Section 2241 of the federal habeas
statute, federal courts have jurisdiction over extraterritorial habeas
petitioners in Guantánamo.64 This ruling opened the door to the issue
of what process is due to such detainees. In Hamdan and Boumediene, the Supreme Court dealt with the process due to non-US citizens being detained as enemy combatants.65
In Hamdan, the Court dealt with the issue of whether military
tribunals created by an Executive Order of President Bush provided

58

Id. at 585-86 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
542 U.S. 466 (2004).
60
548 U.S. 557 (2006).
61
553 U.S. 723 (2008).
62
Compare Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510 (plurality opinion) (stating that Hamdi was a
citizen of the United States), with Rasul, 542 U.S. at 470-71 (stating that petitioners
were Australian and Kuwaiti citizens), Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 566 (stating petitioner
was a Yemeni national), and Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 732 (stating petitioners were
aliens).
63
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 470.
64
Id. at 484-85.
65
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 567; Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 732.
59
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adequate process to the alien defendant.66 In Afghanistan in 2001,
militia forces captured petitioner Hamdan, a Yemeni national, and
turned him over to the United States military.67 In 2002, he was
transported to prison in Guantánamo.68 ―Over a year later, the President deemed [Hamdan] eligible for trial by military commission for
then-unspecified crimes.‖69
In a 5-3 decision, the Supreme Court held that the system of
military tribunals was illegal in that the procedures utilized therein
contravened the Uniform Code of Military Justice (―UCMJ‖) as well
as the Geneva Conventions.70 Although the Government argued that
the President had executive authority to convene such military commissions, Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, reasoned that
there was no need to decide this issue because Congress had authorized military commissions in Article 21 of the UCMJ and neither the
AUMF nor the Detainee Treatment Act (―DTA‖)71 had authorized the
President to expand or alter the provisions set forth in the UCMJ.72
Article 36 of the UCMJ requires that ―[a]ll rules and regulations made under the [UCMJ] shall be uniform insofar as practicable . . . .‖73 The Court determined that the procedures set forth in the
Executive Order were significantly inconsistent with the UCMJ.74
Although the procedures required that the accused be presented with
a copy of the charges against him, be presumed innocent, and receive
―certain other rights typically afforded criminal defendants in civilian
courts and courts-martial,‖ the Court stated that these protections
were undercut by other provisions.75 These provisions included the
fact that the presiding officer could exclude the defendant and his civilian counsel from certain portions of the proceedings, did not per66

Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 566-67; see also Detention, Treatment, and Trial of
Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,833
(Nov. 13, 2001).
67
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 566.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 564, 567 (indicating Chief Justice Roberts did not participate).
71
See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, H.R. 2863, 109th Cong. § 1001 (2005)
(providing no authorization for the Executive branch regarding the provisions set
forth in the UCMJ).
72
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 594-95.
73
Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 836 (2006).
74
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 624.
75
Id. at 613-14.
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mit the defendant to examine all the evidence against him, permitted
the introduction of both hearsay evidence and evidence obtained from
coercion, and did not require that live testimony nor written statements be sworn.76 The Court also noted that both the accused and his
counsel might be denied access to relevant evidence deemed to be
―protected information.‖77 Concluding that these provisions significantly deviated from the procedures set forth in the UCMJ and that
the Executive had failed to show adequate justification for these variations, the Court held that Hamdan‘s military commission was illegal.78
The Supreme Court‘s decisions in Hamdi and Hamdan triggered responses from the other branches of government. In 2004, the
Deputy Secretary of Defense (in response to the Court‘s decision in
Hamdi) established Combatant Status Review Tribunals (―CSRTs‖)
with jurisdiction to determine whether individuals detained at Guantánamo were enemy combatants.79 The order set forth the procedures
governing the hearings.80 Congress also passed the Detainee Treatment Act, which set forth standards for review of the decisions from
CSRTs.81 In response to Hamdan, Congress passed the Military
Commissions Act (―MCA‖)82 in 2006, which stripped federal courts
76

Id. at 614.
Id. at 613-14. The Court further elaborated:
―[P]rotected information‖ . . . includes classified information as
well as ―information protected by law or rule from unauthorized
disclosure‖ and ―information concerning other national security
interests,‖ . . . so long as the presiding officer concludes that the
evidence is ―probative‖ . . . and that its admission without the accused‘s knowledge would not ―result in the denial of a full and
fair trial.‖
Id. at 614 (quoting U.S. DEP‘T OF DEF., MILITARY COMMISSION ORDER NO. 1, §§
6(D)(5)(a)–(b) (Aug. 31, 2005), available at
http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/MCO%20No.%201%20(Aug%2031,%202005).pdf).
78
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 624-25. The Court went on to find that the military
commissions also violate the Geneva Conventions, although there was no majority
opinion as to the manner by which the Geneva Conventions were violated. Id. at
625-26.
79
Joseph Blocher, Comment, Combatant Status Review Tribunals: Flawed
Answers to the Wrong Question, 116 YALE L.J. 667, 670 n.15 (2006); see also
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 733-34.
80
Blocher, supra note 79, at 671, 674.
81
Id.
82
28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1) (2006).
77

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss1/6

10

Shaw: American Military Tribunals

2012]

AMERICAN MILITARY TRIBUNALS

39

of jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus petitions pending at the time of
its enactment.83 In Boumediene, the Court held that because the DTA
did not provide adequate review of CSRT decisions, the MCA was
unconstitutional.84
In Boumediene, foreign nationals were detained at Guantánamo as enemy combatants.85 They denied being enemy combatants.86
They claimed the privilege of habeas corpus, alleging that the MCA
could not constitutionally deprive courts of jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus petitions.87
The Court started by noting that the writ of habeas corpus applied to Guantánamo88 and that Congress had not suspended the
writ.89 The Court then stated that absent such a suspension, Congress
could only preclude habeas review if the DTA functioned as an effective substitute for habeas review.90 The Court then concluded that the
DTA did not so function.91
The Court started by looking at the constraints on the defendant‘s ability to rebut the government‘s assertion that he is an enemy
combatant and noted the following deficiencies:
[The detainee] does not have the assistance of counsel
and may not be aware of the most critical allegations
that the Government relied upon to order his detention. The detainee can confront witnesses that testify
during the CSRT proceedings. But given that there
are in effect no limits on the admission of hearsay evidence—the only requirement is that the tribunal deem
the evidence ―relevant and helpful,‖ the detainee‘s opportunity to question witnesses is likely to be more
theoretical than real.92
The Court then concluded that even if all parties acted in good faith,
and with diligence, there was still ―considerable risk of error in the
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92

Id.
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 732-33.
Id. at 732.
Id. at 734.
Id.
Id. at 771.
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771.
Id. at 792.
Id.
Id. at 783-84 (citations omitted).
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tribunal‘s findings of fact‖93 and stated that a functional equivalent of
habeas corpus would need to provide the reviewing court the ability
to correct such errors.94
The Court recognized that under the DTA the District of Columbia Court of Appeals had ―the power to review CSRT determinations by assessing the legality of standards and procedures‖ and that
this implied the power of the Court of Appeals ―to inquire into what
happened at the CSRT hearing and, perhaps, remedy certain deficiencies in that proceeding.‖95 But the Court noted that this was the extent of the Court of Appeals‘ jurisdiction and that there was:
[N]o language in the DTA that can be construed to allow the Court of Appeals to admit and consider newly
discovered evidence that could not have been made
part of the CSRT record because it was unavailable to
either the Government or the detainee when the CSRT
made its findings.96
The Court noted that such evidence might be ―critical to the detainee‘s argument that he is not an enemy combatant‖ and should not be
detained.97
Consequently, the DTA did not serve as an effective substitute for the writ of habeas corpus and Congress‘s attempt to strip the
Court of habeas jurisdiction was invalid.98 Although the Court held
that non-US citizens at Guantánamo had the right to petition for a
writ of habeas corpus, the Court explicitly stated that this was the extent of its holding and that it was not addressing what standards of
law should govern review of the writ.99
III.

CONCLUSION

The striking note that resounds from Hamdi, Hamdan, and
Boumediene is the insistence of the Judiciary that it, not the Executive or the Legislature, controls the power to set standards for due

93
94
95
96
97
98
99

Id. at 785.
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 786.
Id. at 789.
Id. at 790.
Id.
Id. at 792.
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 795.
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process.100 Further, the Judiciary insisted on setting more stringent
standards than the Executive was willing to set.101 Given the passions
aroused during times of strife, it makes sense that the branch of government least affected by politics, and therefore likely to be less affected by those passions, should set the standards protecting those accused of being foreign combatants.

100
101

See, e.g., id. at 797-98.
Id.
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